[칼럼] Korea Story 11 - Foreign Affairs and National Security 3 by Atty Jeong-kee Kim

2024-10-08     뉴스코리아(NEWS KOREA)

편집자 주     본지에서는 전세계 외국인 독자들을 대상으로 한국의 역사와 문화를 정확하게 소개하기 위해 김정기 변호사의 칼럼을 영문판으로 연재를 시작합니다.

한국의 역사와 문화에 관심있는 전 세계인들에게 도움이 되길 바랍니다.

한국어 독자들은 한국어로 번역된 화면이 보이므로 반드시 사이트 상단에서 원문보기로 설정하셔야 영문판으로 보실수 있습니다.

 



 

​김정기 변호사

☆김정기 총장 주요 약력☆
 

● 학력
- 뉴욕주립대학교(StonyBrook) 정치학과 수석졸업
- 마케트대학교(Marquette) 로스쿨 법학박사
- 하버드대학교(Harvard) 케네디스쿨 최고위과정
- 베이징대학교(Peking) 북한학 연구학자

 

 

● 경력
- 제8대 주상하이 대한민국 총영사(13등급 대사)
- 2010 상하이엑스포 대한민국관 정부대표
- 아시아태평양지방정부네트워크(CityNet) 사무국 대표
- 세계스마트시티기구(WeGO) 사무국 사무총장
- 밀워키지방법원 재판연구원 
- 법무법인 대륙아주 중국 총괄 미국변호사
- 난징대학교 국제경제연구소 객좌교수
- 베이징대학교 동방학연구원 연구교수
- 국민대학교 정치대학원 특임교수
- 동국대학교 경영전문대학원 석좌교수
- 숭실사이버대학교 초대 총장

 

 

● 저서
- 대학생을 위한 거로영어연구[전10권](거로출판사)
- 나는 1%의 가능성에 도전한다(조선일보사)
- 한국형 협상의 법칙(청년정신사)
- 대한민국과 세계 이야기(도서출판 책미듬)

(Newskorea=Seoul) Digital News Team = Korea Story  11 - <Foreign Affairs and National Security 3   by Atty Jeong-kee Kim>


● North Korea collapse scenario and the truth about US-China intervention

◇ Is a military coup possible in North Korea?

Many South Koreans might hope for the possibility of a military coup due to the Kim family’s three-generation succession and reign of terror. 

In a regime like North Korea's, however, the likelihood of a coup is nearly inconceivable. Even if military leaders were to succeed in a coup, they would likely maintain a façade of collective leadership by positioning a figurehead from the Baekdu bloodline at the forefront, while retaining true authority behind the scenes.

There are many reasons why a military coup does not occur in North Korea. 

First, there is the Supreme Leader System.
Under the one-man rule system, the Workers' Party of North Korea thoroughly controls the military, and makes any military uprising difficult. The preamble of the WPK’s charter explicitly states that the party is guided solely by the Juche and revolutionary ideologies of the Great Leader Kim Il-sung. This means that Kim Jong-un holds unique leadership within the party. The WPK's Organization and Guidance Department oversees military personnel and budget decisions on a broad scale and also carries out inspections, effectively controlling the military. The Political Bureau manages organizational and propaganda activities within the military and exerts influence over military personnel, ensuring strict military control. Additionally, the Ministry of State Security under the State Affairs Commission is responsible for gathering intelligence on the military. Consequently, the North Korean People's Army  is essentially Kim Jong-un's private army, supported by the WPK’s leadership, preventing the rise of any independent military faction. Therefore, it’s not just challenging for the military to gain power, but even if a coup were attempted, any signs of such an uprising would be swiftly and brutally suppressed in its early stages. The consequences would likely be merciless purges, public executions, or imprisonment in political prison camps.

Let’s take a closer look for a better understanding. The General Political Bureau of the North Korean People's Army is organized to mirror the command structure of the military, from the General Staff and the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces down to corps, divisions, regiments, and companies. This structure ensures that the Workers' Party of North Korea maintains leadership and control over every level of the military. The key to keeping the KPA as the "Party’s Army" lies in the thorough control exercised by the Political Bureau

In each military unit, the chain of command is supplemented by political officers and security officers, creating a peculiar structure and a fully operational mutual surveillance network. In this system, one political officer from the GPB is assigned to each platoon, while three political officers are assigned to battalions and higher units to monitor the KPA. Additionally, the Ministry of State Security operates a separate surveillance system. High-ranking officers, such as division commanders and above, are under such intense scrutiny that five different departments report their movements to Kim Jong-un every five minutes. Kim Jong-un's movements are so secretive that even his guard units are kept in the dark, and every movement is secured by multiple layers of tight security, including inspections for explosives within a 5 km radius. In such an environment of pervasive surveillance, it’s likely that a sense of resignation dominates. Someone once said that North Korea is like a giant prison. In a regular prison, if a gap appears, thoughts of escape might arise, but in a prison with multiple layers of advanced defense systems, wouldn’t it be easier to simply give up the idea altogether?
 
Second, there’s the factor of the political-economic interest community.
The military plays a central role in the regime, sharing power and wealth, which cements its loyalty to the Kim family. Under the communist dynasty system of North Korea, if the Baekdu bloodline represents the royalty, the military generals, including the descendants of the anti-Japanese partisans, are the aristocrats who pursue shared interests. These partisan descendants or military generals, who could potentially form military cliques and become adversarial forces, instead remain loyal to the Baekdu bloodline. In return, they enjoy power and opulence, which motivates them to maintain the status quo rather than disrupt it. It's important to understand that these individuals are deeply accustomed to working loyally and obediently, rather than defying the supreme command, which has been the case since the founding of North Korea. In essence, they do not form military cliques but remain loyal soldiers of the Kim family.

Choe Ryong-hae, a prominent descendant of the partisans, is a prime example. Choe Ryong-hae’s influence spans across the military, the party, and the government to such an extent that he alone could orchestrate a military coup in North Korea. However, he would never lead a coup because he is part of a shared-interest community that dates back to his father, Choe Hyon. The same applies to other partisan descendants and military generals. They operate a number of related businesses, including 154 military factories, which are highly lucrative. The military directly engages in profitable ventures, controlling all the lucrative businesses. The North’s largest gold mines (in Hoechang, South Pyongan Province, and Yonsan, North Hwanghae Province), major fishing grounds, forest resources, and coal mines, as well as recently acquired control over electricity generation, are all under the military's control. Corps commanders, who have seized control of various regional interests, are now quasi-tycoons with assets worth over a million dollars, and their children are also amassing wealth.


Third, there is the factor of idolization stemming from the deification of the North Korean leadership. From birth, North Korean citizens are subjected to intense indoctrination, resulting in the Kim family and its descendants being perceived as living gods. Only the Baekdu bloodline is recognized as the supreme authority. Consequently, even if a military coup were to succeed, the new leadership would struggle to gain the people's support. The power grab would be seen as illegitimate, leading to significant social unrest. Such a situation would not last long, as continuous cycles of new leaderships rising and falling would create a political vicious circle, which is undesirable for any potential coup plotters.

Fourth, there is the China factor. China plays a crucial role in legitimizing the North Korean regime and ensuring its stability. Any rebellion against the current regime, which has China's approval, would be perceived as a challenge to China itself, making military action extremely difficult. The longevity of the Joseon Dynasty, which lasted for 500 years, can be partly attributed to the role of Ming and Qing China as protectors through a tributary relationship. Similarly, China views North Korea as a critical buffer state against maritime powers. Thus, it is highly unlikely that China would abandon North Korea. In conclusion, there is little chance of a military coup in North Korea.


◇ Is a riot by North Korean residents possible?

It has been since the 1990s that South Korea has entered an era of abundance, and even if we go back in our history, we have never lived well. Even if we only look at the Joseon Dynasty, people lived much worse than North Koreans, but just as Joseon did not collapse due to economic difficulties, it is inconceivable that North Korea also suffered riots and collapsed due to food shortages and economic difficulties. Since the mid-1990s during the Kim Jong-il regime, millions of people have been starving, and his power base as the son of late Kim Il-seong has been so weak. Nevertheless, Kim Jong-il successfully governed North Korea through a system of "legacy politics.  Even if a riot broke out due to starvation, it would have been suppressed at an early stage. And on the social side, there is the problem of North Korean defectors, which is serious in South Korea, but is only the tip of the iceberg in North Korea, so it is unlikely to be linked to the possibility of an early collapse.

◇ Is a riot by North Korean residents possible?

It has been since the 1990s that South Korea has entered an era of abundance, and even if we go back in our history, we have never lived well. People of the Joseon Dynasty lived much worse than North Koreans. Just as the country did not collapse due to economic difficulties, it is inconceivable that North Korea also suffered riots and collapsed due to food shortages and economic difficulties. Since the mid-1990s during the Kim Jong-il regime, millions of people have been starving, and the power base has been so weak that it has maintained its reputation through benevolent rule. Even if a riot broke out due to starvation, it would have been suppressed at an early stage. And on the social side, there is the problem of North Korean defectors, which is serious in South Korea, but is only the tip of the iceberg in North Korea, so it is unlikely to be linked to the possibility of an early collapse. 


◇ Is a big deal between the U.S. and China possible?

Many are concerned that a secret agreement like the ‘Second Katsura Taft Treaty’ will be created between the United States and China, in which the fate of the Korean Peninsula will be determined according to their own interests. In other words, behind-the-scenes negotiations are underway where the U.S. cooperates with China's Taiwan policy, but China condones or cooperates with the U.S. attack on North Korea. Some experts are worried that a 'second Katsura Taft Treaty' may be emerging, but there is no agreement between the U.S. and China. I don't think there is any possibility of such a secret agreement being reached. The time when the United States uses the Taiwan card as a whip against China will be the time when China becomes one of the two major axes of world order, both in name and reality. At this time, China will emerge as a strong challenger to the existing order led by the United States, and the United States will actively use the Taiwan issue as a means of controlling China. It has already begun!

This means that the United States will not easily give up an important card in controlling China over the North Korean nuclear issue, which can be resolved through a peaceful settlement. Of course, the U.S. post-war foreign policy has attempted to replace regimes that run counter to its own interests, but due to the poor intelligence network on the North Korean regime, the U.S. cannot move internally even if it wanted to stage a coup on its own. In that case, In that case, China needs to take action, but from China's perspective, it is unlikely to pursue a diplomatic policy that involves regime change in North Korea through interference in its internal affairs.
 Although China did not automatically intervene according to the Korea-China Friendship Treaty, its traditional foreign policy rarely attempted to change the regime of neighboring countries through interference in the internal affairs of China. Even if a situation arises where China replaces the North Korean regime, China will not necessarily step forward and do such a thing if that regime later becomes a pro-American regime and cannot be expected to play a role as a buffer zone. Moreover, after the establishment of Korea-China relations in 1992, North Korea does not trust China 100%, so it has been paying attention to information leaks, and China, which cannot secure complete information on North Korea as before, will not attempt to change Kim Jong-un's regime by moving inside North Korea.

 China will not create a situation where a big deal is made with the United States or an early collapse of the Kim Jong-un regime, not only to show consideration for its traditional neighbors, but also to avoid destroying the peace and stability that is important in pursuing China's economic priority policy. Additionally, the early collapse of the Kim Jong-un regime could be an opportunity for China, but it could also be a crisis. For example, if a new situation arises due to a change in the North Korean regime, the issue of North Korean defectors will arise. Where will these people go? It will immediately spread to the three northeastern provinces of China, but even if that were not the case, the Chinese government, which is troubled by 55 ethnic minorities, has no reason to welcome as many as 500,000 North Korean refugees entering the three northeastern provinces and inciting the Korean-Chinese people, causing social unrest. Ultimately, social unrest leads to political and economic unrest, but China, which prioritizes the economy, will not choose a structure that destroys peace and stability. China will wait patiently until it develops the power to stand up to the United States, and that will be in 2050, so the possibility of a big deal between China and the United States is also slim.


◇ What will happen to U.S.-China intervention if Kim Jong-un dies?

Scenario 1
U.S. and China will be watching the trend for a while.

If Kim Jong-un dies due to a failed surgery, which is highly likely, U.S. and China will be watching the situation rather than immediately intervening. The succession of power to Kim Jong-il upon the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994 was carried out stably through a long-term succession process, and the succession of power to Kim Jong-un upon the death of Kim Jong-il in 2011 was unstable due to a short-term succession process, but was carried out smoothly. However,, if it is necessary to ensure a stable succession of power, China will exercise all-round influence with minimal interaction with the United States.

Perhaps Kim Yo-jong will be put forward, or if there is a dispute over her legitimacy, Kim Jong-un's son will be chosen as the successor, Kim Yo-jong will be put forward as a kind of regent until he becomes an adult, and the partisan descendants will support him. No matter what happens, it is highly likely that we will move towards a single group leadership system like the current Chinese Communist Party, rather than the previous one-person leadership system. In this case, due to the characteristics of a single group leadership system, in other words, it is easy to change policy in a structure that divides power rather than a one-man monopoly system, and there is more space for the United States and China to exert influence. In particular, this would involve North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons, adopting reform and openness policies, and accelerating economic development by attracting large-scale investments.

Scenario 2
China and U.S. will intervene immediately.

If Kim Jong-un dies and, although extremely unlikely, a coup d'état occurs, China with U.S. will intervene immediaty. In this case, while China is well-versed in North Korean politics, it chooses not to act alone. Instead, China informs the United States, which then involves the UN, leading to a coordinated response by the U.S., China, and the UN working together. It is a kind of division of roles. 

China will immediately deploy ground troops to suppress the coup forces. This is not only to maintain traditional political influence over North Korea, but also because North Korea's economic dependence on China is more than 91%, and various economic interests in North Korea's underground resources must be protected. Meanwhile, the United States and the UN will take over North Korea's nuclear facilities and attempt to completely dismantle them. This is because it is believed that if something goes wrong with the supreme leader of North Korea, a nuclear state, and a belligerent coup force gains control of nuclear weapons, not only the United States but also all countries in the Asia-Pacific region may become concerned. Considering that North Korea possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking the United States and has tested nuclear weapons that can be mounted on missiles, who has control over nuclear weapons in North Korea and what is the situation? In the same vein, a senior State Department official said that it is in the U.S. national interest to know about developments that could lead to great instability.

 

저자 김정기 변호사

 

☆ Author:  Atty Jeong-kee Kim ☆

 

● Education
- Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, Summa Cum Laude, State University of New York at Stony Brook
-  Doctor of Jurisprudence, Marquette University Law School
- Senior Executive Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
- Research Scholar in North Korean Studies, Peking University

 

● Experience
- Consul General of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai
- Commissioner General for the Korean Pavilion at the 2010 Shanghai Expo
- CEO, Asia-Pacific Local Government Network for Economic and Social Development (CityNet)
- Secretary General, World Smart Sustainable Cities Organization(WeGO)
- Law Clerk, Milwaukee Circuit Court, USA
- Senior Attorney-at-Law, Dr & Aju LLC
- Distinguished Visiting Professor, World Economy Research Institute, Nanjing University
- Research Professor, Institute of Oriental Studies, Peking University
- Distinguished Professor, Graduate School of Political Science, Kookmin University
- Chair Professor, Graduate School of Business, Dongguk University
- First President of Soongsil Cyber University

 


● Publications
- Georo English Studies Series for College Students [10 volumes] (Georo Publishing)
- I Challenge the Possibility of One Percent (Chosun Ilbo)
- The Art of Negotiation (Cheongnyonneongsin Publishing)
- Korea and the World (Chekmidum Publishing)

 

 

 

 

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