[칼럼[ Korea Story 13 -Foreign Affairs and National Security 5 by Atty Jeong-kee Kim

(Newskorea=Seoul) Digital News Team = Korea Story 13 - 
<Foreign Affairs and National Security 5   by Atty Jeong-kee Kim>

● Prospects of U.S. Policy Towards North Korea

Biden's North Korea policy, broadly speaking, is a mix of dialogue and pressure. However, it seems that while the dialogue door is open, the approach involves increasing the level of pressure, based on principles of dealing with North Korean nuclear issues.

Moreover, Biden understands that the North Korean nuclear issue is too complex to resolve with a few high-level summits that produce non-substantial or new agreements. Therefore, unlike Trump's top-down approach, Biden prefers a bottom-up method, giving more authority to working-level negotiation teams. Nonetheless, Biden did state during a TV debate that he could meet Kim Jong-un if the North Korean leader agreed to reduce nuclear capabilities. However, this reduction in nuclear capabilities is something that could be a result of negotiations, which might not be persuasive for North Korea.

From the perspective of emphasizing the tradition and continuity of American diplomacy, Biden has two major options. Obama's Strategic Patience and Clinton's Perry Process. The order may change depending on North Korea's response, and it may be a compromise type chosen for the first and second halves. In other words, Biden will review the North Korea policy he had when he became vice president eight years ago, so he will maintain strategic patience with the Obama administration in the early stages of his term, and then actively intervene in North Korean issues in the latter stages of his term, implementing the Clinton third term system, that is, the Perry Process. I think there is a high possibility of switching to . Nevertheless, Biden will not sincerely cling to denuclearization negotiations where there is much uncertainty in resolving the issue in relation to his re-election bid. Therefore, it seems likely that Moon Jae-in's fake pacifism will be ignored. In any case, Biden will focus on maintaining the status quo, just like Obama and Clinton did before him, and North Korea will become an unofficial nuclear state in name and reality in the meantime.  Let’s look at Biden’s two options again.

First, continuing Obama’s core North Korea policy of 'strategic patience.' Strategic patience refers to a U.S. policy of waiting for North Korea to change while maintaining pressure due to the lack of success in active negotiation efforts. Some criticize this approach for merely allowing North Korea time to enhance its nuclear capabilities. While Trump elevated North Korea issues on the U.S. foreign policy agenda, Biden has not prioritized it. This is due to the array of domestic issues Biden faces, such as COVID-19 response, racial discrimination, climate change, and economic revival, which will take time to address before engaging in challenging denuclearization negotiations. It seems likely that he might not address North Korea at all during his term. Essentially, this could lead to a strategy of neglect, potentially resulting in a scenario similar to Pakistan’s, where neglect leads to recognition as a nuclear state. Biden, being well-versed in strategic patience from his eight years as Vice President under Obama, is aware of the failure to resolve North Korea’s nuclear issue and multiple nuclear tests during the Six-Party Talks era. Thus, he may not fully trust this approach. However, in the early stages of his administration, Biden may adopt this approach to delay addressing North Korea issues, while gradually pushing for it.
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Second, adopting Clinton’s proactive engagement policy, known as the 'Perry Process.' The Perry Process is a roadmap proposed by former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry in October 1999 as North Korea policy coordinator. It involves three stages: the first stage offers economic incentives if North Korea halts missile launches; the second stage provides further rewards if North Korea stops nuclear development; and the final stage includes establishing diplomatic relations between North Korea and Japan, as well as North Korea and the U.S., to build a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Following this roadmap, Perry visited North Korea in May 1999, and later, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited North Korea and met Kim Jong-il. The U.S. and North Korea almost established diplomatic relations. However, when George Bush became President, he overturned Clinton’s policy, and the U.S.-North Korea relationship returned to confrontation. Biden might choose this approach after addressing pressing issues, but with limited time remaining in his term, it is likely that this strategy would only be used if North Korea engages in high-intensity provocations, such as testing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), as a negotiating card.

What is North Korea’s stance? Does it have enough time, economic resources, and political leeway to consider the U.S. position? If Biden continues with a strategy of neglect throughout his term, will North Korea just wait? The key question is whether North Korea can endure the triple burden of COVID-19, UN economic sanctions, and natural disasters. After over two years of difficult waiting under Biden’s administration, can North Korea continue to endure? Perhaps North Korea might engage in provocations to expedite negotiations and create a 'crisis diplomacy' situation. North Korea may need to make Biden recognize the urgency of the Korean Peninsula issue and test Biden’s crisis response capabilities, even if negotiations do not resume. U.S. experts share similar views, though there may be differences in the severity of North Korean provocations.

There is concern that the Korean Peninsula might be caught in turmoil once again. The evolution of North Korea’s nuclear issue over 30 years—from the attack scenarios on the Yongbyon nuclear facility during the Clinton era, the Geneva Agreement, five nuclear tests during the Bush and Obama administrations, one nuclear test during the Trump administration, and eventual nuclear possession—highlights the tragic reality that Koreans are doomed to live with the burden of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Biden’s diplomacy is distinctly different from Trump’s. Biden actively demands that South Korea, as an 'alliance of democracies,' participate in this diplomatic effort, and the Yoon Suk-yeol administration has warmly responded to this demand.

☆ Author:  Atty Jeong-kee Kim ☆

● Education
- Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, Summa Cum Laude, State University of New York at Stony Brook
-  Doctor of Jurisprudence, Marquette University Law School
- Senior Executive Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
- Research Scholar in North Korean Studies, Peking University

● Experience
- Consul General of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai
- Commissioner General for the Korean Pavilion at the 2010 Shanghai Expo
- CEO, Asia-Pacific Local Government Network for Economic and Social Development (CityNet)
- Secretary General, World Smart Sustainable Cities Organization(WeGO)
- Law Clerk, Milwaukee Circuit Court, USA
- Senior Attorney-at-Law, Dr & Aju LLC
- Distinguished Visiting Professor, World Economy Research Institute, Nanjing University
- Research Professor, Institute of Oriental Studies, Peking University
- Distinguished Professor, Graduate School of Political Science, Kookmin University
- Chair Professor, Graduate School of Business, Dongguk University
- First President of Soongsil Cyber University

● Publications
- Georo English Studies Series for College Students [10 volumes] (Georo Publishing)
- I Challenge the Possibility of One Percent (Chosun Ilbo)
- The Art of Negotiation (Cheongnyonneongsin Publishing)
- Korea and the World (Chekmidum Publishing)