[칼럼] Korea Story 41 - Politics and Election 5  by Atty Jeong-kee Kim

(NewsKorea=Seoul) Digital News Team = Korea Story 41 - <Politics and Election 5  by Atty Jeong-kee Kim>

● Winning Strategy for Candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 2022 Presidential Election *authored on November 3, 2021.

On November 5, Yoon Sul-yeol, who embodies the spirit of the era demanding a change in government, will be selected as the presidential candidate for the People Power Party (PPP). However, there are still challenges to overcome. In the short term, it is necessary to bring together competitors from the fierce primary election and form a unified election campaign committee. In the long term, securing the victory in the March 9 election hinges on expanding support to the center through an alliance or unification with Ahn Cheol-soo’s party, completing the unification of opposition candidates.

Above all, let’s discuss forming a unified team.

The election campaign committee must be a comprehensive and large-scale body that officially includes all major members, even if complete internal cohesion is not achieved. While party regulations state that the presidential candidate has priority over party affairs, it’s a fact that Lee Jun-seok, the leader of the People Power Party, without prior consultation, has proposed Kim Jong-in as the general campaign chairman, exerting silent pressure. The candidate now faces the challenge of resolving this issue immediately after selection. Maximizing the “convention effect” is crucial, and displaying conflict between the candidate and the party leadership is undesirable. What should be done? Even if the party leader’s preemptive move is irritating, considering the candidate’s weak party base and evolving status as a politician, accepting systemic assistance is wise. In conclusion, embracing the Kim Jong-in general campaign committee structure is advisable.

Debates about recruiting Kim Jong-in are intense, but his advantages outweigh his disadvantages.

His greatest strength lies in his extensive experience and keen political intuition, enabling him to create a comprehensive strategy and engage in winning elections by understanding the Democratic Party thoroughly. This approach translates into producing overarching messages targeting Lee Jae-myung and the Democratic Party.

However, partnering with him comes with challenges.

First, the Kim Jong-in-led committee may demand the dissolution of the existing campaign and a reorganization from scratch.

The upper echelon of the committee, including the general chairman, standing chairman (party leader + others), and a symbolic joint chairman panel, is functional by nature, making concessions possible. Despite this, utilizing the existing team’s potential remains crucial. For example, Kim Jong-in could focus on creating general anti-Lee Jae-myung messages, Lee Jun-seok could engage the youth and new media, Hong Jun-pyo could handle negative responses, Won Hee-ryong could directly address the Daejang-dong scandal, and former local government leaders could act as regional representatives.

What about the current campaign team members? Selectively integrating them into key roles, such as secretariat, scheduling team, special advisors, comprehensive situation room, strategy office, messaging team, TV debate team, negative response team, policy proposal team, Daejang-dong task force, new media team, and youth team, would be essential. This would mean officially dissolving the campaign while informally maintaining a “shadow” team close to the candidate. When Yoon Seok-yul wins, which group would then play a leading role in the transition team?

Second, resistance from traditional conservative leaders, such as Hong Jun-pyo, who have clashed with Kim Jong-in politically, may arise.

Embracing Hong Jun-pyo, the strongest competitor in the primary election, is crucial for unity. Although he may initially oppose the Kim Jong-in committee and appear uncooperative, as a seasoned politician, he knows that putting personal pride before the greater cause of government change risks his political career. Time will resolve this issue. The same applies to traditional conservative leaders within the party. Given the insecurity surrounding victory in the presidential election, which led to recruiting the candidate, organized opposition against Kim Jong-in would be difficult. Eventually, they will join in for the greater cause.

Third, working toward candidate unification with Ahn Cheol-soo may be challenging.

Many are concerned due to Kim Jong-in’s past experiences, where he felt slighted by Ahn and thus disparaged him. However, Kim, who prides himself as a “president-maker,” would not let personal feelings hinder a greater purpose. His success in unifying Oh Se-hoon and Ahn Cheol-soo during the mayoral by-election proves this.

Next, let’s take a look at the unification of the opposition candidates.

Even with over 55% of the public desiring a change in government, if a victory is not secured in the presidential election, the People Power Party will face a path to collapse. However, the March 9 presidential election is a two-horse race between the lesser evil (Yoon Suk-yeol) and the worst (Lee Jae-myung). Due to the low favorability ratings for both candidates, the outcome will be determined by who can secure the silent centrist votes. While Sim Sang-jung’s campaign is tied to the survival of the Justice Party, it is highly likely that she will eventually align for candidate unification. Thus, unification with Ahn Cheol-soo is an urgent task that must be achieved. How can this be done?

To put it simply, the process of unifying Yoon Suk-yeol and Ahn Cheol-soo will not be easy. Ahn's decision not to merge with the People Power Party is partly due to Lee Jun-seok’s negotiation skills, but the fundamental reason is Ahn’s expectation that his own standing would surge in the presidential race. He is already positioning himself as a key player, insisting that the unification should center around him and showing signs of obstinacy. How should we respond? When Ahn declared his candidacy in the Seoul mayoral by-election, he had pledged not to run for president. However, after losing to Oh Se-hoon in the unification poll, he changed his stance and announced his presidential bid. This reversal places considerable pressure on him if he decides to step back and join a unification effort. While it is impossible for Ahn to win the election on his own, he can disrupt the People Power Party candidate’s chances of victory.

Ahn Cheol-soo’s actions as a politician have often disappointed the public. Nevertheless, if the presidential race becomes a three-way battle, he could take about 10% of the centrist vote. To break it down, if conservatives and centrists form the main opposing fronts, the People Power Party candidate could secure 43% (3% extreme right, 30% right, 10% center-right), while the Democratic Party candidate could take 47% (10% center-left, 30% left, 7% extreme left). The remaining 10% centrist vote would stay in the middle. With the strong public desire for a change in government, the People Power Party could add 7-10%, reaching 50-53%, while the Democratic Party would add only 0-3%, standing at 47-50%, giving Yoon Suk-yeol a likely edge over Lee Jae-myung. However, beating the ruling party’s candidate, who has ample human and material resources, is not guaranteed. If Ahn Cheol-soo runs and takes 10%, the outcome would be Yoon Suk-yeol at 43%, Lee Jae-myung at 47%, and Ahn Cheol-soo at 10%. This means that without unification with Ahn, a victory for Yoon is unattainable.

What should we do? This situation may be more difficult than the New Korea Party's merger with Lee Ki-taek’s Democratic Party or the DJP coalition of Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil. Even in challenging circumstances, achieving candidate unification must be viewed as a top priority, and the necessary price must be paid to accomplish it. There are two main paths to candidate unification with Ahn: merging the parties or creating a joint government led by Yoon and Ahn. The former is an absorption merger, while the latter involves forming a coalition government. For Ahn, who has a history of making sudden withdrawals, “sufficient justification” will be needed. While party mergers may be considered, ultimately, he will likely push for the creation of a joint government. Ahn may use brinkmanship as his strategy, forcing a choice between shared survival or a grand rebirth. The goal for Yoon is to fulfill the dream of changing the government. Everything must be done to achieve that goal. Failure to do so would be a betrayal of the public yearning for change. The optimal solution is merging the parties for candidate unification; the secondary option is creating a joint government. Initially, the negotiation should focus on the first card led by the parties, but if talks continue to fail, Yoon should meet Ahn directly and propose the second card as a breakthrough. Yoon himself must take the decisive gamble. Oh Se-hoon did the same in the final stages of his unification talks and emerged victorious.

● Strategy for Negotiations on Yoon Suk-yeol and Ahn Cheol-soo’s Unified Candidacy Polls.

The proposal from Ahn Cheol-soo for unification as a candidate must be weighing on our mind. But I generally agree with Ahn’s proposal following the Oh Se-hoon and Ahn Cheol-soo version, but I believe some rules need to be adjusted to create a mutually beneficial structure. It’s important to note that intense negotiations over rule-setting took place before the Oh-Ahn agreement was finalized, and in the end, Oh Se-hoon’s significant concession made it possible. At that time, as an informal negotiator, I communicated one-on-one with Oh Se-hoon, and when negotiations faced difficulties, I strongly advised him with the paradoxical maxim, “To lose is to gain.” Ultimately, Oh’s major concession projected an image of magnanimity to the sentiment-driven Korean public, securing victory by nearly double-digit margins and leading to a decisive win over Park Young-sun in the main election.

However, there is one crucial aspect Ahn Cheol-soo has overlooked. The proposal Ahn made is fundamentally lacking in fairness.

Oh Se-hoon then is a completely different story. Before running for mayor, Oh had deep-rooted support within the party, having even run for party leader, and his political stance spanned the center-right, with some appeal to the left, minimizing the effect of cross-voting. Thus, he could engage in a unification poll without protective measures against cross-voting. Comparatively, Yoon's ties to the People Power Party are less entrenched, his image leans more conservative, and he is viewed by the left as someone to be defeated. This means left-leaning individuals can use cross-voting to sway the election outcome significantly.

Polling experts estimate cross-voting can affect up to 16% of results. With the political spectrum roughly split as 40% conservative, 20% centrist, and 40% progressive, if progressives engage in cross-voting, it could result in a 28% to 12% advantage for Ahn over you, creating a 16% margin favoring Ahn in a unified conservative-centrist candidacy. The lack of protective measures in the poll gives Ahn an unfair 16% advantage.

When polling for candidate unification, the center votes would split 4:6 (8% for Yoon, 12% for Ahn out of 20%), the conservative votes would split 8:2 (32% for Yoon, 8% for Ahn out of 40%), and progressive votes would split 3:7 (28% for Ahn, 12% for Yoon out of 40%). This ultimately results in Yoon Suk-yeol with 52% and Ahn Cheol-soo with 48%, securing victory for Yoon. However, achieving this requires rallying the 32% conservative base by mobilizing all 253 district offices. It is crucial to emphasize that if Ahn becomes the unified candidate, it would lead to inevitable defeat in the main election, and thus, the dream of a change in administration would be lost. The poll results should be tied to nominations for the 2024 general election to create a tense, warlike atmosphere among district offices.

If Yoon accepts Ahn’s proposal with slight modifications and launch an all-out conservative campaign, he could narrowly win. However, it is also true that 100% victory is not guaranteed. To eliminate this uncertainty, I suggest proposing a compromise to Ahn.

Ahn probably does not entertain any illusions of winning this election. With the gap in approval ratings over fivefold, it would be unrealistic. In this context, Ahn should be offered at least some justification and satisfactory benefits. Instead of forcing a unilateral surrender, the poll for unification itself could serve as justification, while also securing part of future power for tangible benefits..

In negotiation theory, when there is only one pie, a splitting strategy is used. I propose a win-win approach by dividing the polls into "candidate suitability" and "electability." Include cross-voting measures for suitability, but exclude them for electability. In this way, conservatives and centrists would judge suitability, while the public, including progressives, would judge electability. This aligns with both the 2002 Roh Moo-hyun and Chung Mong-joon poll with cross-voting measures and the 2021 Oh Se-hoon and Ahn Cheol-soo poll without such measures, ensuring historical fairness. This reduces the progressive cross-voting risk from 16% to 8%, ensuring a victory for you beyond the margin of error.

● Election loss Is certain if unification fails.

Candidate, it is midnight. Peace prevails while everyone sleeps.

Yoon Seok-yul called by the people, bearing the historic mission of a regime change. However, this requires urgent and earnest efforts throughout the process. Even if destiny has Yoon becoming president, it must be pursued sincerely, or divine forces may alter that destiny. Yoon must keep in mind the saying, "Heaven helps those who help themselves." It means that success will not just fall from the sky. While Yoon will exert superhuman effort to fulfill his historical duty of election victory, if he lacks Solomon-like wisdom, all efforts may turn to naught in an instant.

A few months ago, I heard that Yoon carries a strong conviction—a "faith"—about winning this election. Demonstrating unwavering belief in victory to the public, especially key groups, is crucial for any presidential candidate. Yet, when alone, returning to reality and inducing self-imposed tension through endless self-questioning and pushing oneself is essential. This humility is the driving force behind achieving dreams.

The second deadline I set for a unified candidacy with Ahn Cheol-soo—February 27—is almost upon us. Time is running out. Now is the time to wake from any enchantment of destined victory and seek victory urgently in the real world. Yoon must become the righteous figure of our times, a savior responsible for the fate of 50 million compatriots. Make a resolution. Embrace Ahn with a grand agreement. Recall once again the maxim, “To lose is to gain.” 

Of course, it won’t be easy. However, great leaders who have shaped history have always made decisions. My brother-in-law, Lee Ki-taek, former leader of the Democratic Party, was believed to be the next in line after Presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. Yet, he missed his chance because he could not make decisive choices at critical moments. In contrast, Roh Moo-hyun, who graduated 10 years after him from Busan Commercial High School, and Lee Myung-bak, four years his junior from Korea University, became presidents. The difference was simple: taking risks and making decisions. Lee Ki-taek was destined to be president but failed to secure that destiny due to indecision. President Kim Young-sam once told me, “If Ki-taek had been with me, he would have become president,” expressing regret. Thus, personal destiny is ultimately forged by one’s own decisions. One must become the creator of one’s fate.

Seek urgently during the process, and be Solomon at the decisive moment.

☆ Author:  Atty Jeong-kee Kim ☆

● Education
- Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, Summa Cum Laude, State University of New York at Stony Brook
-  Doctor of Jurisprudence, Marquette University Law School
- Senior Executive Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
- Research Scholar in North Korean Studies, Peking University

● Experience
- Consul General of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai
- Commissioner General for the Korean Pavilion at the 2010 Shanghai Expo
- CEO, Asia-Pacific Local Government Network for Economic and Social Development (CityNet)
- Secretary General, World Smart Sustainable Cities Organization(WeGO)
- Law Clerk, Milwaukee Circuit Court, USA
- Senior Attorney-at-Law, Dr & Aju LLC
- Distinguished Visiting Professor, World Economy Research Institute, Nanjing University
- Research Professor, Institute of Oriental Studies, Peking University
- Distinguished Professor, Graduate School of Political Science, Kookmin University
- Chair Professor, Graduate School of Business, Dongguk University
- First President of Soongsil Cyber University

● Publications
- Georo English Studies Series for College Students [10 volumes] (Georo Publishing)
- I Challenge the Possibility of One Percent (Chosun Ilbo)
- The Art of Negotiation (Cheongnyonneongsin Publishing)
- Korea and the World (Chekmidum Publishing)