편집자 주     본지에서는 전세계 외국인 독자들을 대상으로 한국의 역사와 문화를 정확하게 소개하기 위해 김정기 변호사의 칼럼을 영문판으로 연재를 시작합니다.

한국의 역사와 문화에 관심있는 전 세계인들에게 도움이 되길 바랍니다.

한국어 독자들은 한국어로 번역된 화면이 보이므로 반드시 사이트 상단에서 원문보기로 설정하셔야 영문판으로 보실수 있습니다.
 

 

☆김정기 총장 주요 약력☆

 

● 학력
- 뉴욕주립대학교(StonyBrook) 정치학과 수석졸업
- 마케트대학교(Marquette) 로스쿨 법학박사
- 하버드대학교(Harvard) 케네디스쿨 최고위과정
- 베이징대학교(Peking) 북한학 연구학자

 
● 경력
- 제8대 주상하이 대한민국 총영사(13등급 대사)
- 2010 상하이엑스포 대한민국관 정부대표
- 아시아태평양지방정부네트워크(CityNet) 사무국 대표
- 세계스마트시티기구(WeGO) 사무국 사무총장
- 밀워키지방법원 재판연구원 
- 법무법인 대륙아주 중국 총괄 미국변호사
- 난징대학교 국제경제연구소 객좌교수
- 베이징대학교 동방학연구원 연구교수
- 국민대학교 정치대학원 특임교수
- 동국대학교 경영전문대학원 석좌교수
- 숭실사이버대학교 초대 총장

 
● 저서
- 대학생을 위한 거로영어연구[전10권](거로출판사)
- 나는 1%의 가능성에 도전한다(조선일보사)
- 한국형 협상의 법칙(청년정신사)
- 대한민국과 세계 이야기(도서출판 책미듬)

(NewsKorea=Seoul) Digital News Team = World Story 6 - <Vision 6  by Atty Jeong-kee Kim>

● How to View China's Power Elite and Civil Society?

Throughout its long history, China has always been a country with the pride and self-esteem of being the center of the world (中華). As is well known, in the past, China had five unified dynasties: Han, Tang, Yuan, Ming, and Qing. These five unified dynasties accounted for 30% of the world's GDP at the time and led the region's politics, economy, and culture, reigning as the dominant power in Asia. This is known as the so-called "Pax Sinica."

Today's China is also nurturing ambitions to become a hegemonic power, or the center of the world order, with its remarkable economic growth. Can they truly recreate the Pax Sinica of the past?

Of course, the world order of modern times is very different from the feudal era. To seize global hegemony, one must become an economic powerhouse and achieve complete political democratization and reform and opening-up. Democratization equates to the maturity of civil society. China has achieved its dream of becoming an economic powerhouse, except in the financial sector, and has undergone reform and opening-up. But what about the maturity of civil society?

In Korea, there is still skepticism and negative views regarding China's rapid growth and "Pax Sinica." This is due to a subjective illusion caused by viewing China through American and Western perspectives and values, leading to a one-sided assessment of China's future. Therefore, an accurate and objective perspective on the power elites leading China and Chinese civil society is necessary.

First of all, if one views China merely through the framework of being a communist or socialist state, one cannot truly understand China. Today's China should be seen as an extension of the past feudal dynasties. The elite structure, political system, and social structure of China are very similar to those of the feudal dynasties. It should be understood that the "People's Republic of China," following the Qing Dynasty, is a communist dynasty ruling the Chinese mainland. China, having left behind the lost 180 years since the Opium Wars, is making national efforts to establish a new world order.

The driving force behind China's rapid development over the past 40 years since the reform and opening-up can be attributed to the exceptional leadership of China. The power elite group in China consists of 95 million Communist Party members, who make up the top 7% of the population, and their loyalty to the Party is absolute.

Among them, the so-called "princelings" (太子黨), who can be considered China's 'inner circle' and 'noble class,' are the descendants of the founding heroes of the People's Republic of China in 1949, as well as family members and close associates of Deng Xiaoping and central party leaders. Unlike in Korea and Western societies, where power can only be exercised during one's term, these individuals form 'guanxi' (关系) based on mutual trust, creating exclusive interest groups that inherit or perpetuate privileges even after their retirement.

China's Xi Jinping is also a member of the princelings and, with the active support of Deng Xiaoping's son, Deng Pufang, has risen to the position of supreme leader. Some members of the princelings have entered the economic field and succeeded as private entrepreneurs, showing a trend where political and economic power is converging. It is expected that between 2030 and 2050, important state-owned enterprises in China will be privatized, with the princelings likely to control economic power at the center of this process.

China's decision-making structure is also noteworthy. Traditionally, the highest decision-making in the Chinese Communist Party was carried out by a collective leadership system of seven Politburo Standing Committee members. However, since Xi Jinping, this has changed to a unitary collective leadership system, where the supreme leader monopolizes decision-making. While the pure collective leadership system involved a democratic conflict resolution process and made wise decisions prioritizing national interests, thus enhancing efficiency, democratic countries, including Korea, have decision-making bodies composed of various representatives, leading to conflicts and slower final decisions. In contrast, China's top ruling elite, within the framework of the Party, are 'super' seniors with CEO-like capabilities in politics and administration, and because they easily form a consensus among leaders with well-trained high caliber, there has been little occurrence of unproductive infighting. Nevertheless, the breakdown of this structure since Xi Jinping's 'imperial era' is a regrettable development for China's future.

Additionally, the leader selection system is highly efficient, tailored to socialist characteristics. It starts from grassroots organizations such as village (村), township (鄕), and town (鎭) representatives, progresses through county (縣) and provincial (省) representatives, and eventually reaches National People's Congress (全人代) representatives, and then to central committee members (ministerial level), Politburo members (deputy prime minister level), and Politburo Standing Committee members (prime minister level). This tiered system cultivates and trains individuals in various fields such as politics, administration, and management.

The highest-ranking officials at the central level, as well as local party secretaries aspiring to become future political elites (the party secretaries of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing are Politburo members at the vice-premier level; provincial party secretaries are central committee members at the ministerial level; and the party secretaries of major municipalities (municipalities directly under the central government) are deputy ministerial level officials, while other cities have high-ranking officials at the director-general level), all exhibit outstanding leadership. With over 30,000 high-ranking officials ranging from the premier level down to the director-general level, China’s bureaucratic system is the strongest in the world. While some criticize the corruption among Communist Party officials, when viewed as an extension of a feudal society, the level of corruption is considered socially acceptable. Just as in a feudal society where 10% of the elite controlled political and economic power, with the remaining 90% tacitly consenting, the concept of corruption differs from the democratic societal perspective.

From this perspective, dismissing China's leadership resources as both qualitatively and quantitatively inferior, and viewing their 'Pax Sinica' negatively through a Western lens that reduces China's system to a party-centered, feudal-like structure, is not objective. China is developing in a highly organized, efficient, experienced, and wise manner at an astonishing speed according to its own system. Therefore, their 'Pax Sinica' is not an entirely unattainable dream. It is at least as plausible as the coexistence of Pax Romana and Pax Sinica during the Han Dynasty and the Roman Empire.

The modern era is the age of the people. Regardless of how authoritarian or monarchic a state might be, the power of the people is formidable, and as seen in the so-called 'Jasmine Revolution,' the strength of the people is increasingly rising worldwide. So, what about the civil society in China, which still retains socialist uniformity and traditional feudal characteristics?

Some in democratic Western societies predict that China might collapse due to the growth of civil society and independence movements in border regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang. It is true that China is currently in the early stages of civil society formation, with the growth of a 'moderately well-off society' through economic growth and an increase in 'white-collar' workers, marking a point where the political aspirations of its citizens are emerging. Generally, the middle class begins to rise when GDP per capita reaches around $10,000, and as of 2023, China's GDP per capita has exceeded $13,000.

Nevertheless, given that China is an extension of a feudal society, the likelihood of forming a 'civil society' in the Western sense in the near future appears low. In case of China the state owns 76% of the national wealth. In other words, three-quarters of the GDP belongs to the state, while only one-quarter goes to the citizens. Consequently, although China’s GDP per capita exceeds $13,000, in practical terms, it should be viewed as around $4,500. Thus, the actual GDP experienced by ordinary citizens still does not reach the level needed for the formation of a civil society. Therefore, while political aspirations similar to those in Western democratic societies might emerge by around 2050, they are unlikely to emerge in the near term.

The most significant reason why forming a civil society in China is difficult lies elsewhere. In democratic countries, the core groups of civil society are typically intellectuals and capitalists. However, in current China, their social status and roles differ greatly from those in Western democracies, preventing them from becoming part of the power elite. In short, there is no leading group to guide civil society.

Unlike in the West, Chinese university professors, medical doctors, and lawyers have lower political, social, and economic statuses (in China, a professor's status is comparable to a teacher in Korea, a medical doctor is similar to a pharmacist, and a lawyer is akin to a paralegal). Journalists, like reporters, are mostly just propaganda agents or public information officers for the Communist Party. As a result, even in the ‘National People's Congress’ (NPC), which could be considered a leading group in China, there is no visible representation of intellectuals as a group of experts. They belong to eight democratic parties that act as rubber-stamp supporters of the Communist Party's one-party rule.

Although the proportion of successful private entrepreneurs participating in the NPC has risen to around 8%, the interlocking of political and economic power to maintain mutual privileges means they are still unlikely to be the main force in forming a civil society.

The Communist Party of China is the most efficient governing body in China's history. Party members hold the title of ‘secretary’ in all organizations, thus controlling and dominating both the minds and bodies of ordinary citizens. People find it very difficult to escape this control exerted by the Communist Party.

China, having experienced the dark period of the ‘Cultural Revolution,’ knows through historical experience the severe repercussions and costs of challenging political power. Therefore, even if civil society does develop in China in the future, political participation will not be easy and is expected to be limited to economic and social areas.

Consequently, to properly understand China and forecast its future, one must accurately analyze and grasp its unique system, as viewing it through Western perspectives and values can easily lead to errors and misconceptions.

☆ Author:  Atty Jeong-kee Kim ☆

● Education
- Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, Summa Cum Laude, State University of New York at Stony Brook
-  Doctor of Jurisprudence, Marquette University Law School
- Senior Executive Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
- Research Scholar in North Korean Studies, Peking University

● Experience
- Consul General of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai
- Commissioner General for the Korean Pavilion at the 2010 Shanghai Expo
- CEO, Asia-Pacific Local Government Network for Economic and Social Development (CityNet)
- Secretary General, World Smart Sustainable Cities Organization(WeGO)
- Law Clerk, Milwaukee Circuit Court, USA
- Senior Attorney-at-Law, Dr & Aju LLC
- Distinguished Visiting Professor, World Economy Research Institute, Nanjing University
- Research Professor, Institute of Oriental Studies, Peking University
- Distinguished Professor, Graduate School of Political Science, Kookmin University
- Chair Professor, Graduate School of Business, Dongguk University
- First President of Soongsil Cyber University

● Publications
- Georo English Studies Series for College Students [10 volumes] (Georo Publishing)
- I Challenge the Possibility of One Percent (Chosun Ilbo)
- The Art of Negotiation (Cheongnyonneongsin Publishing)
- Korea and the World (Chekmidum Publishing)